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Operation Vivaldi – Ukraine’s Secret Counteroffensive at Lyman

Operation Vivaldi – Ukraine’s Secret Counteroffensive at Lyman

28. September 2026 Oddi Comments 0 Comment

Dette innlegget er også tilgjengelig i: Norsk bokmål Русский Українська

While much of the attention surrounding the war in Ukraine has been focused on Russia’s slow advances in Donetsk, Ukraine has been conducting a counteroffensive for several months that was kept almost entirely out of the public eye for a long time. The operation has been named Vivaldi and is taking place mainly north and northwest of the city of Lyman.

It wasn’t until September 15, 2026, that Ukraine publicly confirmed the offensive. By then, the fighting had already been going on for several months.

What’s interesting about Operation Vivaldi isn’t just how much territory Ukraine has recaptured. The offensive also demonstrates how the war has evolved into a battle over drones, electronic warfare, logistics, and information—and how Ukraine is attempting to regain the ability to carry out more traditional offensive operations.

This blog post was written with the help of ChatGPT. It has been reviewed and some linguistic changes were made before publication.

Russia was advancing toward Lyman

Lyman has long been an important target for Russia. The city is located northeast of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, which are among Ukraine’s most important remaining cities in the Donetsk region.

Russia’s long-term goal is to capture the entire Donetsk Oblast.

One possible Russian strategy has been to push toward Lyman and onward toward the Siverskyi Donets River. This could open up the possibility of attacking Sloviansk from the northeast.

At the same time, Russian forces are pressing against the Ukrainian defense zone further south.

Thus, in theory, Russia could attempt to attack the Ukrainian “fortress belt” around Sloviansk and Kramatorsk from multiple directions.

It was this development that Ukraine wanted to stop. Ukraine’s covert operation, Vivaldi, was intended to halt Russia’s advance.

The Vivaldi Offensive Begins

Map showing the location of the Vivaldi offensive:
Illustration created using ChatGPT

Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps, under General Andriy Biletsky, therefore launched a series of counteroffensives north of Lyman.

Rather than a single large-scale offensive, Operation Vivaldi appears to consist of several phases.

When the operation was made public on September 15, Ukraine reported that approximately 75 square kilometers had been cleared of Russian infiltration forces, while an additional 10 square kilometers had been liberated.

Among the areas where Ukraine reported progress were Serednie, Novoselivka, Yarova, Oleksandrivka, and the area around Korovii Yar. At the same time, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed that the Ukrainian gains were likely greater than what Ukraine initially announced.

The offensive continued.

On September 20, Ukraine reported that Shandryholove and Derylove had been liberated, while full control had been restored over Drobysheve.

On September 22, the ISW assessed that Ukraine had liberated at least 125 square kilometers north of Lyman.

On September 28, new information emerged. Ukraine then claimed to have liberated the villages of Nove, Ridkodub, and Katerynivka, while control had been reestablished over Karpivka and Novomykhailivka.

In this phase alone, an additional 51 square kilometers are said to have been recaptured.

These figures must be treated with caution. The front line in this war is often unclear, and “cleared,” “liberated,” and “control reestablished” do not necessarily mean the same thing. It is therefore difficult to directly add up all the Ukrainian figures.

Why was the offensive kept secret?

One of the most interesting aspects of Vivaldi is precisely this secrecy.

Ukraine carried out the operation under strict media blackout. Soldiers and units disclosed very little about the advance while it was underway.

That was likely crucial to the success of the offensive.

In modern warfare, the front lines are continuously monitored by reconnaissance drones. A large concentration of soldiers and vehicles can quickly be detected and attacked.

Ukraine therefore sought both to conceal its own forces and to reduce Russia’s ability to see what was happening.

According to Ukrainian officers, the information blackout helped mislead the Russian leadership. At the same time, Russian drone operators, logistics, fuel supplies, and electronic warfare systems were systematically targeted.

Before certain attacks, Ukraine gathered forces in hiding, struck Russian positions and drone bases, and then advanced its infantry. ISW believes this enabled Ukraine to reintroduce limited mechanized maneuver warfare in an area where the front had long been characterized by positional warfare.

In other words, the secrecy was not just a PR ploy. It was part of the actual use of military force.

An offensive against Russia’s logistics

Vivaldi isn’t just about capturing villages, either.

Before and during the offensive, Ukraine carried out an extensive campaign against Russian logistics behind the front lines.

According to the ISW, Ukrainian drones initially struck targets up to about 50 kilometers behind the front lines and later as far as 120 kilometers away. One of the objectives was to target supplies and fuel.

This is important because modern Russian units are highly dependent on electronic warfare to protect themselves against Ukrainian drones. Electronic systems, in turn, require power, often from diesel-powered generators.

By targeting fuel and logistics, Ukraine could thus indirectly weaken Russia’s electronic warfare capabilities and make Ukrainian drones more effective.

“Vivaldi” is therefore as much a logistics and drone offensive as it is a traditional ground offensive.

The Larger Ukrainian Offensive

Vivaldi must also be viewed as part of a larger picture.

In 2026, Ukraine has carried out counteroffensive operations along several sections of the front. Reuters reported in September that Ukraine had previously recaptured more than 700 square kilometers in southeastern areas.

This does not mean that Ukraine has launched an offensive on the same scale as the summer offensive in 2023. Russia is still attacking in several areas and continues to hold a significant advantage in both personnel and equipment. But Vivaldi shows that the front line is not moving in just one direction.

Ukraine is trying to identify areas where Russian forces have advanced too far, weaken their supply lines, and then launch local attacks.

How important is Vivaldi?

The most interesting aspect of the offensive, therefore, may not be the number of square kilometers Ukraine has recaptured.

What matters is where the offensive is taking place.

Russia wanted to use the Lyman area as a potential northern axis of attack against Sloviansk and the larger Ukrainian defensive belt in Donetsk.

The ISW assesses that Vivaldi has disrupted this plan and made a large-scale Russian encirclement maneuver more difficult.

Russia has also had to redeploy reserves to the Lyman area to stabilize the front line.

This means that Operation Vivaldi may have consequences far beyond the area that has actually been liberated.

Ukraine has not won the battle for the Donbas with Operation Vivaldi. Russia still has significant forces in the area, and the offensive is ongoing.

However, Ukraine has demonstrated something of strategic importance: the Russian advance is not necessarily irreversible.

By combining secrecy, drones, attacks on logistics, electronic warfare, and limited mechanized advances, Ukraine has managed to retake territory while simultaneously disrupting a key Russian offensive plan.

That may be the most important lesson from Operation Vivaldi.

Sources:

Reuters: Ukraine Launches Offensive in the North of the Donetsk Region, Senior Commander Says

ISW: Assessment of the Russian Offensive Campaign, September 15–2026

ISW: Assessment of the Russian Offensive Campaign, September 22, 2026

Ukrainska Pravda: Operation Vivaldi: Ukraine Liberates Three More Villages Near Lyman

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